With the NFL's current antitrust exemptions and other activities under some scrutiny, 6 I figured it was a good time to jump on the bandwagon. The NFL's "nonprofit" status is questionable at best. At worst it's a sham that has the public lining already-rich owners' pockets with ill-gotten gold.
Today, boys and girls, I'm going to tell you a wonderful story about the NFL and the IRS and how they met and fell in love. Okay, in all candor, it might not be a wonderful story and the NFL and IRS may not exactly be †. Juris Doctor Candidate 2010, [name redacted] Law School. The author would like to thank (and absolve of any responsibility) Professor [name redacted] for help and encouragement, his parents (who prefer not to be named), his wonderful fiancée (who also prefers not to be named), his soon-to-be stepchildren (who would be mortified if named), and his dog Opal (who whimpered a bit, but didn't otherwise object to being named).
1. Matthew Stevenson, The Football Franchise Hustle: Financing the NFL, NEWGEOGRAPHY.COM, JAN. 2, 2010, http://www.newgeography.com/content/001299-the-footballfranchise-hustle-financing-nfl.
2. GREG LEROY, THE GREAT AMERICAN JOBS SCAM: CORPORATE TAX DODGING AND THE MYTH OF JOB CREATION 157 (2005) (quoting Art Modell, owner of the Cleveland Browns and later, the Baltimore Ravens).
3. I'm not talking about an oxymoron (although a moron on OxyContin usually doesn't make a whole lot of sense either). I'm talking about regular irony.
4. Yes, I'm going to use contractions in this piece. As a member of a law review, I've had to slog through some dry, boring, pretentious, excruciatingly "correct" legal scholarship. I believe legal scholarship can-and should-read like normal writing and needn't follow outdated and arguably pointless "rules." On that smarmy note, see BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK § 1.78(c) (2d ed. 2006). If you noticed that I don't double-space after periods, I have a rule for that too. Id. § 4.12. Despite my smarminess complex, I'll do my best to make you smile as you read this.
5. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2006 I'll try to keep this lively. Law review articles are generally boring. I know this; you know this. 8 Your average law review article is an unparalleled sleep aid. "Indeed, whenever a judge, a lawyer, a law professor, or a law student writes something truly funny he or she runs the risk of waking up days later, in restraints and sedated in a little room with a fellow in a white coat holding a clipboard." 9 So in an effort to earn myself a bed at the Danvers State retreat, I embark on this endeavor: write an article about the NFL's tax status that is both informative and funny.
10 This is no easy task. Tax law is a particularly unfunny subject. 11 Add to that the unsexy law-review-article format and you've got a recipe for a real sleeper.
12 But I'm confident that with enough cheap shots, juvenile humor, amusing quotes-and of course, plenty of footnotes-I'll be able to hold your attention for the requisite three or four pages that it'll take to get this pile-err, gem of legal analysis-past the articles committee.
13 I hope you're as excited as I am! As has been drilled into my head often enough over the past few years, a law-review-style article should have an introduction.
14 Check. The introduction also should have a roadmap paragraph. 15 Supposedly, the roadmap paragraph is helpful for the busy reader. 16 But that's a big load of bovine excrement. The roadmap paragraph is for me to organize my 7. You know you could do it too, you big, bad legal scholar, you. 8. So does Thomas E. Baker. I owe him a great debt for his compilation of law review humor. Indeed, some of the footnotes in this article will be copied (read stolen) directly from his fine work: Thomas E. 
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Taking a Sack 3 otherwise incoherent ramblings into some semblance of cogency-or put another way-to make sense of nonsense. 17 Isn't legal writing fun? That's a sarcastic rhetorical question. But now that I've talked about a roadmap paragraph, and written most of this piece, I suppose it's time to write one. Here goes: Part I of this article discusses the NFL's current tax status. Part II attempts to put the NFL's tax and antitrust exemption in proper context. Part III analyzes the NFL business model from a critical perspective, asking whether the NFL's nonprofit staus is deserved. More importantly, Part III begins with a great Dave Barry quote. This piece concludes, more or less, that the NFL should stop blowing smoke up a certain orifice of the American taxpayer and start paying its taxes.
I. THE NFL'S TAX STATUS
Income tax returns are the most imaginative fiction being written today.
18

A. Classification and Recent Filings
The NFL is a trade association, which is a tax-free entity under the Internal Revenue Service Code. 19 While the NFL is technically a "nonprofit," it's certainly not a soup kitchen. 20 The important thing about tax exemption for the NFL, it seems, is that it enables the NFL to function as a sort of bank for stadium deals, issuing league-backed bonds to finance new stadium construction. 21 We'll discuss that particular use of NFL funds a little more thoroughly later. The only exemption the NFL could've been relying on in the past regards the listing of highly compensated employees. Until recently only charities were required to report their top-five highest-compensated employees who received over $50,000, but were not officers, directors, trustees, or key employees. 28 According to the NFL's second-most-recent tax return, Roger Goodell makes all the decisions. 29 That's funny, because New York (where the NFL is based) requires at least three directors for a nonprofit corporation. 30 Yes, the NFL calls itself and has been called an "unincorporated" trade association, but it would seem that the NFL still fits the definition of not-for-profit "corporation" given in the New York statutes. 31 That means: (a) the NFL is not in compliance with its home-state 31. Id. § 102 ("'Corporation' or 'domestic corporation' means a corporation (1) formed under this chapter, or existing on its effective date and theretofore formed under any other general statute or by any special act of this state, exclusively for a purpose or purposes, not for pecuniary profit or financial gain, for which a corporation may be formed under this chapter, and (2) no part of the assets, income or profit of which is distributable to, or enures [sic] to the benefit of, its members, directors or officers except to the extent permitted under this statute.").
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Taking a Sack 5 law, or (b) the NFL, uh, creatively manipulated the truth on its 2008 tax return.
The NFL was strongly opposed to the new requirements. 32 This, of course, is not too surprising. The most-recent 990 filed by the NFL just confirms that the NFL doesn't take its nonprofit status too seriously. We're talking about an organization that paid 296 salaries over $100,000; over $7 million in legal fees; nearly a million a month for office space; $6.25 million in "travel services"; and 135 total independent contractors at least $100,000 apiece last year. 33 Clearly, there's no money left over for taxes.
B. The Exemption and Its History
One of the most-interesting things about Section 501(c)(6) is that it specifically mentions professional football leagues.
34 I could fill a lot of space here. I could blather on and on about Judge Grim's rulings in two cases against the NFL that, for a brief moment in history would have made the NFL subject to antitrust law. 35 But I'm not supposed to do that. 36 Besides, I already have.
37
One might-indeed "one" now will-speculate that this all goes back to the 1960s when Congress tried to "save" college football.
38 Though I haven't been able to find anything that specifically tells us why section 501(c)(6) includes professional football leagues, there are a few things 32 . See Albosta, supra note 25. 33. NFL, FORM 990 (2009) at 7-8. 34. Section 501(c)(6) includes:
Business leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues (whether or not administering a pension fund for football players), not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. worth noting: (1) the title of the act that added the language doesn't sound even remotely related to football; 39 (2) the act expanded the scope of the NFL's then-existing antitrust exemption; 40 and, (3) President Lyndon Johnson didn't say jack-diddley-squat about football when he signed the bill. 41 What we today call the "AFL-NFL Merger Act" was a couple paragraphs at the end of a bill that started off talking about defining "Section 38 property which is suspension period property . . . ." 42 I'd imagine anyone reading the entire act was so thoroughly and undeniably bored by the time they slogged through discussion on it that it passed by default. Not to belittle our public servants of 1966-this is my general theory regarding most laws that make little sense: somebody was asleep at the wheel. I like to take a "realist" approach to the law. 43 Later, I'll attribute passage of the Act to marijuana usage-stay tuned.
Id. (emphasis added
Presumably, the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 was pro-college football in that it "prohibited the pros from playing on Friday night and Saturday afternoon, the traditional times for college football." 44 This meant, theoretically, that the NFL's televised games would not detract from the collegiate fan base. 45 So, as the old saw goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Goodell's salary although his total compensation is double that of the highest-paid executive on the list.
59
C. So is the NFL Really a Nonprofit?
John Brothers has made some interesting observations, comparing the NFL and the Courage Center, a small nonprofit. 60 Brothers argues that the Courage Center is a true nonprofit whereas the NFL is exploiting the status. 61 He points to the disparities between two February 7, 2010 events: (1) the NFL's Super Bowl, and (2) the Courage Center's $15,000-goal fundraiser. One obvious problem with his premise is that the NFL is a 501(c)(6) and the Courage Center, presumably, is a 501(c)(3). But once you get past that classification, the larger question remains: Do we really think the NFL deserves to be exempt from federal tax?
One of the disparities that Brothers points out is poignant. He notes that the NFL brought in over $450 million with the Super Bowl while the Courage Center worked toward a $15,000 goal. 62 
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II. A LOGICAL EXPLANATION?
A billion here, a billion there-pretty soon it adds up to real money.
66
And that's the rub. Even if we recognize the social goods the NFL provides through its charity work and its facilitation of sometimes-hilarious Super Bowl Commercials, 67 its tax-exempt status is undeserved. Other than two acts dating from the 1960s-when everybody was high on the wackyweed 68 -there's no logical explanation for the NFL's tax-exempt status. Now comes the boring part. Here I'll attempt to explain legitimate reasons why things currently are structured the way they are-and without reference to legislators during the '60s being stoned out of their gourds. 69 First, let's talk about how television worked back before YouTube, Hulu, and Google.
70
A. TV Nation
Back in the '60s cable television was not as widespread as it was today. Early on, in the late-1940s to early-1950s "cable" or CATV was just local broadcast channels "piped" into homes using coaxial cable and signal boosters. 71 Then, in 1963, somebody appealed an FCC decision. 75 Ironically, that would set the stage for exactly the kind of regulation that was being protested.
Carter Mountain Communications was a carrier that wanted to construct a microwave-radio-communication system to transmit distant signals to CATV systems in Wyoming. 76 They filed an application with the FCC. A local Wyoming television station protested. 77 The FCC denied Carter Mountain's application because, essentially, Carter Mountain's refusal to carry the local station would result in the demise of the local station and cause a loss of service for rural customers not within the CATV system's coverage area.
78
Carter Mountain appealed the decision and the D.C. Circuit affirmed. 79 This decision led to the F.C.C. issuing two orders that essentially favored local broadcasting over the long-distance cable broadcast model.
80
So what's with the history lesson? Think back to when the AFL-NFL Merger Act was passed. 81 It was passed about eight months after the FCC said cable companies couldn't screw over the local channels.
82 What that means is that when the AFL-NFL Merger Act was passed, it wasn't that big a deal. It really wasn't. You didn't have cable or satellite TV like we do today; you didn't have ESPN or the NFL Network. This stuff wasn't on the radar. It was all about local markets. At that point who cared if the NFL pooled broadcast rights and got an antitrust exemption? Who was really getting hurt by that?
Nobody. The 1966 rulings "temporarily limited growth of CATV in the nation's top 100 broadcast television markets." 83 Then, in 1968, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's freeze on importation of distant signals into the top 100 markets. 84 What this effectively meant was that CATV was only useful in places with poor signal strength-it was local channels first and foremost unless you were out of range of all channels. The market for big-time, big-money cable-based channels was nonexistent. It wasn't until OF BROAD. COMM., http://www.museum.tv/eotvsection.php?entrycode=distantsigna (last visited May 1, 20201) (discussing early regulatory efforts 
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1972 with a relaxation of the freeze and the advent of HBO that the potential for today's high per-subscriber, sports-broadcasting markets existed. 85 Point is, when the NFL got its exemptions, there wasn't much of anything for anyone to get upset about.
Because the exemptions were granted at the right time, they "flew under the radar" so to speak. Today, those antitrust-exempt media rights are worth several billion per year. 86 ESPN alone pays over a billion a year for its NFL media rights. 87 And for a very long time, football was only on network television-it was 21 years after the exemptions were granted that the NFL first branched out to cable.
88
The major takeaways from all this: (1) in a historical context, the exemption was relatively benign; (2) time, coupled with changes in technology and potential markets, created the tax-exempt media-rights juggernaut that exists today; and (3) it's all ESPN's fault.
89
B. Current Events
Closer scrutiny of the NFL's market position is hopefully imminent. With the American Needle case before the Supreme Court, the NFL's antitrust exemptions could be called into question. 90 At base level, American Needle is a simple contractual dispute over who gets to make NFL-licensed headgear. 91 The dispute at issue, however, gives the Court an opportunity to assess whether the NFL is a "single entity" for antitrust purposes. 92 As some commentators suggest, the NFL is hardly a single entity. 92. See id. at 729 ("This Feature will conclude with a recommendation that the Court reject the NFL's single entity defense on the grounds that it would belie legal precedent and mistakenly characterize league operations.").
93. See id. at 747 (noting that every Circuit Court of Appeals that had considered the issue before the Seventh Circuit in American Needle had not adopted the "single entity" argument, and in fact,
Some Law Review
[Vol. 00:000
Without turning this piece into a primer on antitrust law, let me attempt to explain briefly the issue in American Needle. Antitrust law, Section One of the Sherman Act specifically, prohibits entities from acting together to unreasonably restrain trade. 94 When the government prosecutes, it's a felony and can carry a pretty hefty fine. 95 A private party can also bring a claim under Section One. One essential premise for our purposes is that a single entity cannot compete against itself-it's analogous to a dog chasing its tail. A single entity is not subject to Section One, whereas a joint venture-which is what the NFL has often been classified as-is. 96 Here the NFL sold exclusive apparel-licensing rights to Reebok in a departure from its prior practice of selling apparel-licensing rights to various companies. American Needle was one of the companies that previously had a license.
97
The Seventh Circuit held that the NFL should be treated as a single entity in this transaction because it was promoting a common interestspecifically that of all the member teams as a whole when selling licensing rights. 98 The NFL wants the Supreme Court to adopt the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, perhaps expanding the logic and recognizing the NFL as a single entity in all its dealings. 99 That would be like Chrismahanakwanzaaka for the NFL.
The fundamental fallacy, of course, is that the NFL must have competition to survive. The NFL can't properly be classified as a single entity because it consists of several independently owned teams that compete against each other. Though those teams might share some common interests, like the league's overall success and the success of its products, they just aren't aligned enough to be considered a single entity for many activities. 94. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.").
95. 
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Consider, for instance, if all the teams' interests were aligned enough to warrant consistent treatment as a single entity: Would football still be worth following? If the league is treated as a single entity, the integrity of the game is compromised. Who's to stop the league from deciding that a certain team in a certain city needs to win the Super Bowl in a certain year because that will bring in a lot more revenue than if another team wins? It's not so far-fetched: winning teams increase the fan base, revenues, incidental sales, and so on. The NFL already conditions hosting Super Bowls on stadium improvements. 100 Professional football could become professional wrestling. Not that this is necessarily going to happen, but expecting the NFL to play by the rules when there, essentially, are no rules is like putting Gary Glitter in charge of a Girl Scout troop. This is grossly oversimplified, of course, but should suffice as necessary background. Besides, a gifted and incredibly talented sports-law scholar has already written a poignant article on the American Needle case. 101 At extremes, American Needle could either cement the NFL's antitrust-exempt status in all its activities or subject all the NFL's activities to antitrust analysis. While there are sometimes legitimate reasons to consider common goals in professional sports for certain activities, the single entity defense is dangerous because it gives free rein for the NFL to engage in all kinds of anticompetitive behavior.
For purposes of this article, it's sufficient to recognize that revenue that goes to the NFL through apparel-licensing activities, at least in part, gets funneled into tax-exempt income for the NFL in the form of membership dues and assessments paid to the NFL. 102 play upon that municipal pride and the economic benefits that makes the whole thing Marv-Albert-esque perverted. It's the quintessential "offer you can't refuse" for the team's city.
And then the NFL provides the club. If the city doesn't provide the funds, then the NFL won't either. It needs to be a "public-private partnership." Except the way it works out, the only people who truly benefit from the transaction, the owners, end up contributing just a nominal percentage of the required total. 125 "No matter how the NFL does the math, it's clear who's shouldering stadium costs: The public pays one huge share, and fans pay another." 126 Once again, here's how it works: The new stadium is financed with a combination of public money, NFL loans, and owner-provided financing, sometimes with private-equity investments thrown in the mix as well.
127
Through creative classification, the NFL loans are considered part of the owner's contribution. 128 But the owner only ends up contributing a very small amount.
Technically, the city owns the stadium. 129 Personal seat licenses or PSLs are sold through a public agency, tax-free. 130 Profits are then used to pay down the owner's share of the NFL loan. The money from the PSLs never goes directly to the teams, though the teams save millions of dollars in taxes and the loan from the NFL is paid down significantly, providing a very significant benefit to the owners. 131 
